Matter of Edward B

In Matter of Edward B. (80 N.Y.2d 458 [1992]), a juvenile delinquency petition was attacked by the defense on the revelation that the complainant had never actually read the complaint she signed. The Court of Appeals held that this was not a basis to find the petition jurisdictionally defective, but rather was a "latent deficiency." The Court noted: "In other words, CPL 100.40's standards and its express reference to 'facial' sufficiency were designed to enable the trial court to evaluate the adequacy of the accusation during the preliminary phases of the criminal action so that certain important pretrial decisions about the status of the defendant and the charges can be made." (Matter of Edward B., supra, at 464.) The respondent was charged with committing acts which, if committed by an adult, would constitute first degree robbery and several other offenses. The charges were embodied in a juvenile delinquency petition, accompanied by a supporting deposition which the complainant had signed under oath. During the fact-finding hearing, it was revealed that the complainant had not read or been read the deposition before signing it. The respondent moved for dismissal, pursuant to Family Court Act 311.2 (3) and 315.1 (1) (a), arguing that the petition was legally insufficient because the complainant who signed it did not have actual knowledge of its contents. The Court of Appeals characterized the defect as latent and held that a motion to dismiss for legal insufficiency could not be sustained because the complaint was facially sufficient and the statute under which the motion to dismiss was brought only contemplated dismissal for facial defects. (Supra, at 461, 463.) The Court supported its analysis and conclusion by citing CPL 170.35 and 100.40, which were the legislative bases for those sections of the Family Court Act upon which the motion to dismiss rested. (Supra, at 464.) Specifically, the Court observed that because the case had proceeded beyond the pretrial stages and had entered the fact-finding stage, the need for an accusatory instrument to comply with the requirements of Family Court Act 311.2 (3) was no longer compelling. "Once the pretrial stages of the proceeding have passed and the fact-finding stage has begun, there is no longer a pressing need for an accusatory instrument that complies with Family Court Act 311.2 (3)'s requirements, since the accused has already been brought before the court and the witnesses are available to describe the case against the accused, in person and under oath. It follows that the need for--and the operative effect of--Family Court Act 311.2 (3) are, at that point, dissipated. And, as the Legislature has foreseen, the limited, albeit important, purpose of the statute is amply served by facial compliance." (Supra, at 465.)