In Matter of Gravlin v. Ruppert, 98 N.Y.2d 1 (2002), the parties had chosen to opt out of the Child Support Standards Act guidelines and many of the provisions of their Separation Agreement, which was incorporated but not merged in their divorce judgment, were contingent upon the custody and visitation arrangements. The visitation arrangement in Gravlin was such that the father would have the child with him about 35% of the time and he would support her during that time period. Additionally, he agreed to pay for her clothing and fund a $ 10,000.00 college trust for her benefit. Apparently he did not have an additional child support obligation. The mother had a larger income than the father ($ 35,000.00 vs. $ 23,000.00) and therefore could adequately provide for the child. In Gravlin, the Court of Appeals found that the visitation and contingent support obligations broke down to such an extent, through no fault of either party, that it was impossible for the parties to perform under the terms of their original agreement. This resulted in the custodial parent being the only parent providing support. Under such circumstances, the Court of Appeals held that: "Family Court may reestablish the support obligation of the noncustodial parent by modifying the support provisions of the separation agreement." (Id, p 6.) The next issue the Court of Appeals addressed in Gravlin, was whether the "imposition of CSSA standards was the appropriate remedy after the contracted-for support provisions failed" ( Id, p 6) when the parties had specifically opted out of the CSSA in their original agreement. The Court found that since the reasons for not applying the CSSA guidelines no longer existed, it was just and appropriate to apply this standard. This principle is clearly applicable to the underlying proceeding.