In Matter of Guido, 1 Misc. 3d 825 [Civ Ct, NY County 2003] the court originally denied an application to change the petitioner's given name from one traditionally associated by many in American society with a male gendered individual to one traditionally associated with a female gendered individual until such time as the petitioner had completed gender reassignment surgery and obtained a divorce. Upon renewal, the Guido court concluded that its initial concern with whether the applicant had undergone gender reassignment surgery, and whether a divorce had been obtained from the applicant's wife, were matters "outside the scope of the court's jurisdiction and beyond the scope of the inquiry necessary to avoid lending the court's assistance to fraud, deception or other interference with the rights of third parties." (Id. at 827.) The Guido court had initially reasoned that because same-sex marriages are not recognized in New York State, it would be "'inconsistent for this court to grant the relief requested'." (Id. at 826.) In reversing itself, the Guido court concluded that its initial concerns were "misplaced, as they anticipate questions that simply are not raised by this application." (Id. at 828.) It further stated that "there is no reason--and no legal basis--for the courts to appoint themselves the guardians of orthodoxy in such matters." (Id. at 828.) As the court noted, the petitioner did not ask the court to declare that his sex or gender had been changed, but only to sanction his use of his chosen name. One learned legal commentator has described this approach as "pragmatic." The relevance of Guido to the facts here is its teaching that the role of the court in a name change is a limited one and not to superimpose its view of public policy.