In Matter of Landau v. Hynes, 49 N.Y.2d 128 [1979], it was argued by the defense that the expansion of an investigation into fraudulent and criminal conduct in the nursing home industry to include hospitals should not be allowed. It was also alleged that the referrals from the various commissioners were defective because they failed to specify the indictable offenses sought to be investigated. In rejecting those contentions, the Court held that the plain language of Executive Law 63 (3) bestows upon the Attorney General the broadest of investigative and prosecutorial powers ( Matters of Landau v. Hynes, supra, at 135, 137). More instructively, it held, as follows: "Nor is our holding today altered by the fact that the department heads failed to designate specifically in their letters of request the indictable offenses and persons or businesses sought to be investigated. Suffice it to say that a fair reading of subdivision 3 of section 63 of the Executive Law reveals that it imposes no such requirement, and this court would be remiss in reading this statutory provision in a hypertechnical manner which would defeat its purpose. The wording of the statute itself by providing the Attorney-General with authority 'to prosecute the person or persons believed to have committed [offenses in violation of the law which the officer making the request is required to execute] and any crime or offense arising out of such investigation or prosecution or both' evinces the intent of the Legislature to permit both the investigation of unspecified crimes and the prosecution of unnamed persons . . . "As a practical matter, it would be virtually impossible for the department heads to set forth specifically the crimes sought to be investigated." (Matter of Landau v. Hynes supra, at 137-138.)