In Matter of Lipsky (45 Misc. 2d 320 [Sur Ct, NY County 1965]), the court explored the legal development of holding parties liable for oral pledges made to charities even though not supported by consideration: The Court held that: "A review of the authorities would indicate that the trend of judicial decision during the last century has been towards the enforcement of charitable pledges almost as a matter of public policy (Matter of Kirby, 39 Misc. 2d 190, 240 N.Y.S.2d 214; Liberty Maimonides Hosp. v. Felberg, 4 Misc. 2d 291, 158 N.Y.S.2d 913; Matter of Lord, 175 Misc. 921, 25 N.Y.S.2d 747; Matter of First Methodist Episcopal Church of Mt. Vernon v. Estate of George Howard, 133 Misc. 723, 233 N.Y.S. 451, affd. 233 A.D. 753, 250 N.Y.S. 906; Allegheny Coll. v. National Chautauqua County Bank, 246 N.Y. 369, 159 N.E. 173; Barnes v. Perine, 12 N.Y. 18). In discussing the trend and the gradual expansion of the strictures of the moulds of consideration' as applied to charitable subscriptions, Judge Cardozo stated: Very likely, conceptions of public policy have shaped, more or less subconsciously, the rulings thus made. Judges have been affected by the thought that "defences of that character" are "breaches of faith toward the public, and especially toward those engaged in the same enterprise, and an unwarrantable disappointment of the reasonable expectations of those interested" '. (Allegheny Coll. v. National Chautauqua County Bank, supra, p. 374.) The Court also held that: "In an effort to free charitable pledges or subscriptions from the traditional requirement that an enforcible promise must be supported by consideration, our courts have resorted to various theories. In some instances the decisions are predicated upon the existence and consummation of either a bilateral or unilateral contract (Keuka Coll. v. Ray, 167 N.Y. 96, 60 N.E. 325; Barnes v. Perine, supra; I. & I. Holding Corp. v. Gainsburg, 276 N.Y. 427, 12 N.E.2d 532; Allegheny Coll. v. National Chautauqua County Bank, supra; Liberty Maimonides Hosp. v. Felberg, supra; Matter of de Brabant, 197 Misc. 923, 95 N.Y.S.2d 324; Matter of Lord, supra), and in others the subscriptions have been upheld by application of the equitable principle of estoppel often referred to as promissory estoppel (I. & I. Holding Corp. v. Gainsburg, supra; Presbyterian Soc. v. Beach, 74 N.Y. 72; Allegheny Coll. V. National Chautauqua County Bank, supra; Matter of de Brabant, supra). As the Court of Appeals so clearly stated in Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Childs Co. (230 N.Y. 285, 292-293, 130 N.E. 295): An estoppel rests upon the word or deed of one party upon which another rightfully relies and so relying changes his position to his injury. When this occurs it would be inequitable to permit the first to enforce what would have been his rights under other circumstances'. "In many of the cited cases it is difficult to ascertain the precise theory relied upon to sustain the charitable subscriptions or pledges but the end result has invariably been the same. Sound public policy would appear to dictate these results and this court is in agreement with the efforts made to sustain charitable pledges by our courts. The philanthropic work carried on by organized charities, made possible through voluntary subscriptions, is a distinguishing and distinguished feature of our free society. It is a demonstration of the human sympathy, mercy, consideration and good will borne by those more fortunately endowed towards their less fortunate fellowmen. The agreed facts submitted in the case at bar establish that the respondent charity entered into contracts and incurred liability in reliance upon the pledge made by this decedent and others."