Matter of Marion Burns

In Matter of Marion Burns, 287 A.D.2d 862 (3d Dept 2001), an heir, a nephew of the incapacitated person Ms. Burns, appealed Supreme Court's approval of proposed charitable donations. There was no dispute this nephew was Ms. Burns' closest living relative and the presumptive beneficiary of her Will. The Third Department found Ms. Burns wanted to make the donations; she never, at any time, repudiated her plan to make the charitable gifts; she was opposed to having her assets used to pay her expenses at the nursing home but at the same time, she did not necessarily want her assets to go wholly to her nephew upon her death. Ms. Burns consented to appointment of a guardian of her property. She had previously executed a Last Will and Testament, leaving her estate to her brother, who subsequently pre-deceased her, leaving his son, her nephew, the appellant, who became her sole beneficiary as a result of the anti-lapse provisions. The nephew was entitled to notice of the hearing seeking approval of the gifts, but no notice was given him, and the first appeal resulted in a remand. (See Matter of Burns). When the guardian moved to confirm the proposed distribution of charitable donations, a hearing was held and the Court found, that although Ms. Burns did not have a full appreciation of her assets, she did affirm her intent to make gifts to the listed charities. The Court said: "In enacting Mental Hygiene Law Article 81, the Legislature gave statutory recognition to the common-law doctrine of 'substituted judgment'" [ Matter of John XX, 226 A.D.2d 79, lv denied 89 N.Y.2d 814 (1996)] by expressly authorizing transfers of this kind if it can be shown, by clear and convincing evidence, that these transfers would have been made by Burns during her lifetime if she had the requisite capacity". The Court employed a "standard of reasonableness" in reaching the conclusion that the record of the hearing in Supreme Court established that a "competent and reasonable individual in Burns' position would likely have performed the same act". The Court also found the record supported its finding: 1) Ms. Burns had not "manifested an intention inconsistent with..." the giving of the charitable donations at a time when she did have the requisite capacity; 2) the gifts were "within her means, would not endanger her ability to be self-supporting"; and 3) the nephew who sought to set aside approval of the charitable donations, while her sole surviving heir, "was not the natural object of her bounty."