In Matter of Raquel Marie X, 76 NY2d 387 [1990] the Court of Appeals undertook an examination of Domestic Relations Law 111(1)(e) which is the statute addressing the issue of when consent is required for adoptions involving new born infants placed prior to 6 months of age. The statutory language of Domestic Relations Law 111(1)(e) reads as follows: "Subject to the limitations hereinafter set forth consent to adoption shall be required as follows: ...(e) of the father ... of a child born out-of-wedlock who is under the age of six months at the time he is placed for adoption, but only if: (i) such father openly lived with the child or the child's mother for a continuous period of six months immediately preceding the placement of the child for adoption; and (ii) such father openly held himself out to be the father of such child during such period; and (iii) such father paid a fair and reasonable sum, in accordance with his means, for the medical, hospital and nursing expenses incurred in connection with the mother's pregnancy or with the birth of the child." In Raquel Marie X., the Court of Appeals held that the statutory requirement that an unwed father openly live with the mother before the child's placement for adoption neither legitimately furthered that State's interest nor sufficiently protected the unwed father's interests, and therefore declared section 111(1)(e) unconstitutional (Raquel Marie X, 76 NY2d 387, 394, 559 N.E.2d 418, 559 N.Y.S.2d 855). The Raquel Marie X. Court recognized that the imposition of a new law to rectify the constitutional problems in this situation was the prerogative of the Legislature, however, in the interim, it was necessary to offer the lower courts guidance in deciding consent to adoption issues before any new legislation would be passed. Thus, the Court of Appeals set forth the essential principals to be followed, as gleaned from the relevant United States Supreme Court decisions, which define an unwed father's right to in effect veto an adoption of their new born child (Id. at 408). The language specifying the standards as set forth in Raquel Marie X. is as follows: "In the case of new born infants, we take this to mean that the qualifying interest of an unwed father requires a willingness to assume full custody of the child -- not merely to block adoption by others. In this connection, any unfitness, or waiver or abandonment on the part of the father would be considered by the courts, as they would whenever custody is in issue (see, Matter of Bennett v. Jeffreys, 40 NY2d 543, 356 N.E.2d 277, 387 N.Y.S.2d 821). An assertion of custody is not all that is required. The [US] Supreme Court's definition of an unwed father's qualifying interest recognizes as well the importance to the child, the State and all concerned that, to be sufficient, the manifestation of parental responsibility must be prompt. In reaching thisdetermination, courts should give due weight to the remaining portions of Domestic Relations Law sec. 111 (1)(e), which were directed to that same objective.... Perhaps most significantly, they establish the period in which the father's manifestation of responsibility for the child is to be assessed -- the six continuing months immediately preceding the child's placement for adoption. The interim judicial evaluation of the unwed father's conduct in this key period may include such considerations as his public acknowledgment of paternity, payment of pregnancy and birth expenses, steps taken to establish legal responsibility for the child, and other factors evincing a commitment to the child." (Id. at 408). The Court of Appeals, after reviewing Supreme Court precedent with regard to the rights of biological fathers, summarized the factors to be considered in deciding whether the father's consent to an adoption is required in a particular case. The court declared that "the protected interest is not established simply by biology." [Id. at p. 401] The court noted that the biological parental interest can be lost entirely, or greatly diminished in constitutional significance, by failure to timely exercise it or by failure to take the available legal steps to substantiate it. "In order to have the benefit of the maximum protection of the relationship--right to consent to or to veto an adoption--the biological father not only must assert his interest promptly (bearing in mind the child's need for early permanence and stability) but also must manifest his ability and willingness to assume custody of the child." [Id. at p. 403] The court observed that the unwed father's right is decidedly limited in duration. [See, e.g., Matter of Robert O., 80 N.Y.2d 254, 262 [1992]] "Nonetheless, a father who has promptly taken every available avenue to demonstrate that he is willing and able to enter into the fullest possible relationship with his under-six-month-old child should have an equally fully protected interest in preventing termination of the relationship by strangers, even if he has not as yet actually been able to form that relationship." [Matter of Raquel Marie X., supra at p 403] The Court of Appeals confronted the constitutional issues, holding that a provision of Domestic Relations Law 111 (1) (e)--governing the criteria for consent when the child is placed for adoption before the age of six months--is unconstitutional. Subdivision (1) (e) included a requirement that a birth father live openly with the child's mother for six continuous months before the adoptive placement. The Court found that provision to be unacceptable because it "cuts off [the father's] interest by imposing as an absolute condition an obligation only tangentially related to the parental relationship." (Id. at 405.) Writing for the unanimous Court, Judge Kaye noted that the "living together requirement" focuses on the relationship between father and mother, rather than father and child, and that it can easily be used by the mother to block the father's rights. (Id.)