In Matter of Rodriguez v. Perales, 86 NY2d 361 [1995], an indigent individual challenged New York's attempt to reimburse itself the entire amount of SNA it extended to the individual from retroactive SSI benefits, where the Social Security Administration had recalculated the indigent individual's benefits and consequently paid additional retroactive benefits after the initial SSI payment. ( Matter of Rodriguez v. Perales, 86 NY2d, at 363.) The trial court granted the indigent individual's article 78 petition, and held that, in accordance with the Social Security Act and New York Social Services Law, the State was only entitled to recoup SNA benefits from the initial retroactive SSI payment, and not any subsequent payment, even if the subsequent payment resulted from a recalculation of retroactive SSI. The Appellate Division, First Department, reversed the trial court, and held that the State could reimburse itself out of subsequent payments resulting from a recalculation of retroactive payments. (See, Matter of Rodriguez v. Perales, 205 AD2d 418 [1st Dept 1994].) The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, concluding that the State could only reimburse itself out of the initial payment received from the Social Security Administration, regardless of any subsequent recalculation of the initial SSI payment. In reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeals first noted that, in general, SSI benefits are not subject to attachment, garnishment, or other legal process; thus any legislation in derogation of this general rule must be strictly construed. (Matter of Rodriguez v. Perales, 86 NY2d, supra, at 365.) The Court of Appeals next reviewed the language of 42 USC 1383 (g) (2), which permits the States to recoup interim assistance payments from benefits "that the Commissioner of Social Security has determined to be due with respect to the individual at the time the Commissioner of Social Security makes the first payment of benefits." The Court of Appeals strictly construed this language to literally mean the recipient's initial payment, and refused to graft any additional meaning into the statute. ( Matter of Rodriguez v. Perales, supra, at 366.) Finally, the Court of Appeals placed particular reliance upon a "final decision" issued by the Secretary of the United States Department of Health and Human Services (the Secretary), dated December 5, 1994, in which the Secretary explicitly rejected New York's claim that it should be able to reimburse itself for SNA from recalculated initial SSI payments. In relying upon the Secretary's interpretation of, and decision concerning, the governing statutes, rather than the State's contrary interpretation of these statutes, the Court of Appeals stated that: "As the agency charged with administering and enforcing the SSI program, HHS is entitled to considerable deference in its construction and application of the program's enabling legislation ... An agency's interpretation of the statutes it administers generally should be upheld if not unreasonable or irrational ... "Deference to the Federal agency's construction is particularly appropriate in this dispute involving the Social Security Act, which represents a ' " 'scheme of cooperative federalism' " ' and ordinarily requires participating localities to comply with the Federal administrative agency's regulations and rulings." (Supra, at 367.) The Court of Appeals flatly rejected the Appellate Division's "policy-based concern" that strict interpretation of the relevant statutes would result in a "windfall" to the indigent individual, noting that the Social Security Act "does not evince a legislative intent to ensure a one-to-one correspondence between the amount of interim assistance paid and the amount of reimbursement covered." (Supra, at 368.) The Court of Appeals further noted that "any perceived 'windfall' effect from the rule limiting the State's recovery out of retroactive SSI payments is mitigated by the fact that the State may have other sources for recovering overpayment." (Supra, at 368, citing Social Services Law 158 [d], [e] [i].)