In McCann v. McCann, (156 Misc 2d 540) the trial court then reasoned that attempted murder by one spouse of another would constitute egregious conduct because society values the preservation of human life so highly that conduct that offends that interest would warrant punishment (id at 546). The trial court further proffered that the rational behind other trial courts decisions holding that rape, kidnaping, and a long history of severe physical abuse constituted egregious conduct was that "such conduct callously imperils the value our society places on human life and the integrity of the human body" (id at 547). The trial court in McCann found that the husband's conduct was non-egregious where he deceitfully entered into a marriage based upon his promise to make every effort to have children with his wife and he subsequently refused to fulfill that promise after several years of lying, resulting in the wife, who relied on his promise, passing the age of child-bearing without having a child (see generally McCann, 156 Misc 2d 540, 593 N.Y.S.2d 917). In reaching that determination the trial court considered the role of social harm played in determining whether spousal behavior during a marriage was marital fault, not to be considered by the Court in an equitable distribution award, and egregious conduct, which the Court could consider in an equitable distribution award: ...with respect to the concept of egregious behavior, marital fault may also be understood as a voluntary act in the context of the marriage that causes some social harm. The difference between ordinary marital fault and egregious marital fault, however, concerns the relative importance of the particular social value involved. The more highly the preservation of an interest is valued by society, the more likely it is that the offensive conduct in question will be deemed egregious. A judge, therefore, in determining whether particular conduct amounts to egregious marital fault, must decide whether the social interest compromised by the offending spouse's conduct is so fundamental that the court is compelled to punish the offending spouse by affecting the equitable distribution of the marital assets (McCann, 156 Misc 2d at 546).