McCoy v Feinman (99 NY2d 295 (2002)), was a case in which the plaintiff client brought a legal malpractice action against her former attorney, based on his failure to prepare and file a QDRO in her divorce case. The defendant attorney conceded, and the court held, that the defendant was negligent in failing to assert plaintiff's claim to preretirement death benefits in the settlement stipulation and the judgment of divorce. Thus, the Court concluded, the plaintiff suffered an actionable injury on the day of the stipulation (June 23, 1987), or the day the judgment incorporating the stipulation was filed in the county clerk's office (June 14, 1988). However, because the plaintiff did not commence her legal malpractice action until June 12, 1996, nine years after the settlement stipulation, eight years after the divorce judgment and five years after the Family Court proceeding, the Court held that the continuous representation doctrine did not toll the SOL in the case. The malpractice that caused plaintiff's injury was defendants' failures in connection with the stipulation and judgment, and no further representation thereon was then contemplated. Even were we to grant plaintiff's argument that it was the defendant's failure to obtain a QDRO that constituted actionable negligence, the defendant told the court that he would file the QDRO with the court "simultaneously with or shortly after the judgment of divorce." Thus, plaintiff might have been justified in believing that defendant continued to represent her on this specific matter until "shortly after" the 1988 entry of the divorce judgment, but not eight years later when plaintiff brought this action." (McCoy at 306) In McCoy v Feinman, the wife's attorney failed to assert a claim for preretirement death benefits and no such provision was included in the stipulation settling the action for divorce. When the former husband died prior to retirement, the former wife was denied any share in the death benefit. The Court of Appeals found that the cause of action accrued on the day of the stipulation or, at the latest, the date on which the judgment incorporating the stipulation was filed saying, "we find no reason that plaintiff's damages were not then sufficiently calculable to permit plaintiff to obtain prompt judicial redress." ( Id. at 305).