In People ex rel. Gill v. Greene, 48 AD3d 1003 (3d Dept 2008), revd 1 NY3d 1 (2009) the Court of Appeals held that "when a court is required by statute to impose a sentence that is consecutive to another, and the court does not say whether its sentence is consecutive or concurrent, it is deemed to have imposed the consecutive sentence the law requires" (12 NY3d at 1). The Court of Appeals further explained: "We read the words of Penal Law 70.25 (2-a) -- 'the court must impose a sentence to run consecutively with respect to such undischarged sentence' -- to mean that any sentence imposed by the court shall run consecutively to the undischarged sentence, whether the sentencing court says so or not. . . .Section 70.25 (2-a) says that as a general rule -- with exceptions that include cases subject, as this one is, to section 70.25 (2-a) -- sentences 'shall run either consecutively or concurrently . . . in such manner as the court directs at the time of sentence.' The statute goes on to provide a default rule: 'If the court does not specify the manner in which a sentence imposed by it is to run,' the sentences shall run concurrently in certain classes of cases, and consecutively in others. But where, as in this case, the court has no choice about which kind of sentence to impose, no default rule for interpreting the court's silence is provided by the statute, because none is necessary. The court is simply deemed to have complied with the statute (id. at 2)."