In People ex rel Pughe v. Parrott, 302 AD2d 823, 758 N.Y.S.2d 404, the Appellate Division, Third Department, rejected inmate's Pughe's argument " . . . that the use of the word 'absconding' in the subdivision's [Penal Law 70.30(7)] heading suggests that the failure to return must be intentional, because an 'absconding' is defined elsewhere as '[a]ny inmate who is found to have intentionally failed to return' (Correction Law 856(2))." Id at 824. The Appellate Division went on to explain the rejection of Inmate Pughe's argument as follows: " . . . The text of the statute here unequivocally provides for the interruption of a sentence when the person 'fails to return' without any element of intent (Penal Law 70.30(7)). We also note this well-accepted rule of statutory construction: 'While a heading may clarify or point the meaning of an imprecise or dubious provision, it may not alter or limit the effect of unambiguous language in the body of the statute itself' . . . Because the courts in [Hammer] ignored this maxim, we decline to following the holding of that case and instead conclude that the subdivision's heading does not limit its application to persons who intentionally fail to return to custody . . . Accordingly, we hold that Penal Law 70.30(7) unambiguously provides for sentence interruption whenever a person on temporary release fails to return regardless of whether the failure is intentional . . ." (Id at 824-825.)