In People v Amalfi (141 Misc 2d 940 [Rochester City Ct 1988]), when the complainant called her former husband's residence, she reached the defendant, the girlfriend of the ex-husband, who answered the telephone and threatened the complainant. The court found the information to be facially insufficient because the complainant initiated the communication, holding that "aggravated harassment must involve initiation of a communication by a defendant." (Supra, at 943.) The Amalfi court reasoned that, because the "present aggravated harassment statute transforms communications which might otherwise be considered simple harassments to misdemeanors[,] [t]he more serious charge of aggravated harassment, with its increased penalties, was intended to protect privacy interests." ( People v Amalfi, supra, at 942.) However, there is no invasion of the complainant's privacy where it is the complainant who makes the call. (Supra, at 943.) Despite the broadening of the statute, Amalfi reasoned, "This court cannot perceive that there was a legislative intent to prevent an angry response to an annoying telephone call by the imposition of a criminal charge against the recipient of the telephone call." (Supra, at 942.) The court dismissed an Aggravated Harassment in the Second Degree charge where the challenged language was uttered during a telephone call made when the complainant activated the *69 callback feature on her telephone. The court held that the legislature could not have intended "to prevent an angry response to an annoying telephone call by the imposition of a criminal charge against the recipient of the telephone call." Almost ten years later, the same reasoning was applied in People v. Rusciano, 171 Misc 2d 908, 656 N.Y.S.2d 822 (Just. Ct. 1997). There, too, the court dismissed an Aggravated Harassment in the Second Degree charge because the allegedly threatening statement was made during a telephone call similarly initiated by the complainant.