In People v. Armbruster (32 AD3d 1348 [4th Dept 2006]) the defendant was convicted upon his plea of guilty to, inter alia, attempted sexual abuse in the first degree (Penal Law 110.00, 130.65 [3]). After the defendant's guilty plea was entered and defendant was sentenced as a second felony offender, the People moved to set aside defendant's sentence and filed a second child sexual assault felony offender statement pursuant to CPL 400.19. The defendant contended that the statement was untimely, and that the court, therefore, was precluded from sentencing him as a second child sexual assault felony offender. The Fourth Department rejected this argument and permitted the People to file the CPL 400.19 statement after the guilty plea. Affirming the defendant's adjudication and sentencing as a second child sexual assault felony offender, the Fourth Department concluded that "the CPL 400.19 statement is timely filed in the event that there is a guilty plea if it is filed within a sufficient time before the imposition of sentence to afford the defendant notice and an opportunity to be heard (see generally Preiser, Practice Commentaries, McKinney's Cons Law of NY, Book 11A, CPL 400.19, at 401-402)" (Armbruster, 32 AD3d at 1349). The Fourth Department held that "even assuming, arguendo, that the People were required to file the CPL 400.19 statement before the entry of defendant's guilty plea and that the statement thus was untimely filed, we would nevertheless conclude that the People's failure to file a timely statement pursuant to CPL 400.19 is harmless under the circumstances of this case (see People v. Bouyea, 64 NY2d 1140, 1142, 480 NE2d 338, 490 NYS2d 724 [1985]; People v. Harris, 61 NY2d 9, 20, 459 NE2d 170, 471 NYS2d 61 [1983])" (id. at 1349-1350). The Fourth Department noted that the record established that the judge, the prosecutor, and the defendant all contemplated that the defendant would be sentenced as a predicate offender, and that a potential sentencing range of imprisonment of between 4 and 12 years was contemplated as provided by Penal Law 70.07 (4) (f). In addition, Armbruster admitted his prior conviction and made no objection to being sentenced to concurrent eight-year terms as a predicate felon at the initial sentencing proceeding. Consequently, the Fourth Department found that: "where, as here, 'the statutory purposes for filing a predicate statement (i.e. ,apprising the court of the prior conviction and affording defendant notice and an opportunity to be heard in connection with the predicate felony) are satisfied, strict compliance with [CPL 400.19] is not required' (People v. Sampson, 30 AD3d 623, 623-624, 818 NYS2d 144 [(2d Dept) 2006], quoting People v. Carmello, 114 AD2d 965, 965-966, 495 NYS2d 230 [1985])" (id. at 1350).