In People v. Boyd [188 AD2d 389, 594 N.Y.S.2d 147], the court held that the police cannot "boot-strap" themselves from one level to another by a series of unwarranted and aggressive questions. In Boyd, the defendant's conduct did not give rise to a founded suspicion of criminal activity, yet the officers asked a series of progressively accusatory questions that culminated in the defendant's "consent" to allow the police to open his locked suitcase. The suitcase contained narcotics. Because the consent was a product of the improper police inquiry, the consent was held to be involuntary. In Boyd, the Court after explaining in detail the testimony of the investigating officers in its decision as "an attempt to duplicate the intimidating and accusatory nature of the encounter," and noting law enforcement officer right to "request information," qualified that right of inquiry saying "...they cannot bootstrap' themselves into the next degree of intrusion, i.e., the common-law right to inquire, which is activated by a founded suspicion that criminal activity is afoot, by the type of unwarranted aggressive questioning which took place here." (id. p. 242). The Boyd Court explained that while "a request for information must be made in a general, nonthreatening manner and the individual asked briefly about his identity, destination and reason for being in the area...once...the questions become extended and accusatory and the officer's inquiry focuses on the possible criminality of the person approached, this is not a simple request for information...the encounter has become a common-law inquiry that must be supported by founded suspicion that criminality is afoot' " (id. pps. 242-243). The Court concluded as "...there was no predicate for the second stage of police intrusion...the request to search the defendant's bag was...improper...because it was not based on a founded suspicion' that criminal activity was afoot Because the defendant's consent was a product of an improper police inquiry, the trial court erred when it found that defendant had consented to the search of her bag " (id. p. 243).