In People v. Bright, 71 NY2d 376 [1988], the Court struck down as unconstitutionally vague, a loitering statute which required a suspect to provide a "satisfactory explanation for his or her presence" in order to avoid arrest. The Court said that whether a particular explanation by a citizen was a "satisfactory explanation" was left entirely up to the arresting officer. The Court said that the statute did not sufficiently inform ordinary citizens of what conduct was prohibited, and therefore, it could not survive a challenge on the grounds that it was unconstitutionally vague. The Court stated that the "Rational underlying the requirement [of] adequate notice is the notion 'that no man shall be criminally responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably understand to be proscribed' ." (Bright, supra p. 382.) The Court then defining the "second prong of the test ... not to permit arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement" as "the more important aspect of the vagueness doctrine" said that there needed to be" 'minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement' " and that "The absence of objective standards to guide those enforcing the laws permits police to make arrests based upon their own personal, subjective idea of right and wrong." (Bright, supra, p.383.) The Court of Appeals held a loitering statute that said "a person is guilty of loitering when he loiters or remains in any transportation facility, or is found sleeping therein, and is unable to give a satisfactory explanation of his presence" as unconstitutionally vague. In that case, a police officer approached the defendant inside of Pennsylvania Station. The officer asked the defendant if he had a ticket to a train or intended to take a train. The defendant answered no to both questions. Then, after failing to produce identification, the defendant was arrested for loitering. In People v. Clark, a companion case, that defendant was arrested for loitering in the Port Authority Bus Terminal when he was unable to give a satisfactory reason for being in the Terminal. The court held that the statute promoted arbitrary enforcement because it allowed a police officer to determine whether a person has satisfactorily explained his presence (Id. at 385). Additionally, the statute gave no guidance on what kind of conduct gives rise to a suspicion of loitering. Therefore, if an officer observed a person waiting for his departure, the officer would also have the discretion to stop and question the individual (Id. at 387) The Court discussed the requirement that "the statute must provide sufficient notice of what conduct is prohibited" saying, "the rationale underlying the requirement that a penal statute provide adequate notice is the notion 'that no man shall be held criminally responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably understand to be proscribed' ." "Consistent with our concept of basic fairness, due process requires that a penal statute be sufficiently definite by its terms so as 'to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute' . For this reason, under our State and Federal Constitutions, the Legislature may not criminalize conduct that is inherently innocent merely because such conduct is 'sometimes attended by improper motives,' since to do so would not fairly inform the ordinary citizen that an otherwise innocent act is illegal" ( People v Bright, supra, at 382-383.) In Bright, the Court said that while a term (loitering) "has a commonly accepted meaning ... a statute that merely prohibits loitering, without more, is unconstitutionally vague as such a generalized law fails to distinguish between conduct calculated to cause harm and conduct that is essentially innocent, thereby failing to give notice of what conduct is prohibited." ( People v Bright, supra, at 383-384.) he Bright Court said that only when such laws concerning loitering are qualified by adding "for a specific illegal purpose" or "in a specific place of restricted public access" would such law be no longer constitutionally vague (at 384). The Court stated that the "Rational underlying the requirement [of] adequate notice is the notion 'that no man shall be criminally responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably understand to be proscribed' ." (Bright, supra p. 382.) The Court then defining the "second prong of the test ... not to permit arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement" as "the more important aspect of the vagueness doctrine" said that there needed to be" 'minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement' " and that "The absence of objective standards to guide those enforcing the laws permits police to make arrests based upon their own personal, subjective idea of right and wrong." (Bright, supra, p.383.)