In People v. Chiddick, 8 NY3d 445, [2007] a "substantial pain" case, the victim confronted, and engaged in a scuffle with, the defendant, who was committing a burglary. The defendant bit the victim's finger, cracking his fingernail and causing the finger to bleed. The victim received a tetanus shot and a bandage at a hospital. At the trial, the victim testified that the degree of pain he felt was between a little and a lot of pain. The Court affirmed the defendant's convictions of burglary in the second degree (Penal Law 140.25), and assault in the second degree (Penal Law 120.05 [6] [felony assault, where the defendant or another participant causes physical injury to a nonparticipant]). The Court of Appeals explained that while " 'substantial pain' cannot be defined precisely . . . it can be said that it is more than slight or trivial pain. Pain need not, however, be severe or intense to be substantial" (Chiddick, 8 NY3d at 447). The Court indicated that "several factual aspects of a case . . . can be examined to decide whether enough pain was shown to support a finding" (id. at 447) that the pain was substantial, including whether the victim was bleeding, his or her subjective account of what he or she felt, whether the victim sought medical treatment, and the defendant's motive. The Court noted that an injury that causes bleeding is "an experience that would normally be expected to bring with it more than a little pain," and that seeking medical treatment is "an indication that [the victim's] pain was significant" (id. at 447-448). In People v. Chiddick, the defendant had bitten the complainant's finger, causing the fingernail to crack and the finger to bleed. The complainant was treated at a hospital where he received a bandage and a tetanus shot. The Court held that this injury "would normally be expected to bring with it more than a little pain." (Id.) In Chiddick, the victim also testified about his subjective experience of pain saying it was between "[a] little" and "a lot." (8 NY3d at 447.) Thus, the pain was not "trivial." (Id.) The fact that the complainant sought medical attention also indicated the pain was "significant." (Id.) Finally, the Court found, the revisors' notes to the enactment of the Penal Law indicated that the motive of a defendant may be relevant in the analysis since: "Petty slaps, shoves, kicks and the like delivered out of hostility, meanness and similar motives constitute only harassment and not assault, because they do not inflict physical injury. Motive is relevant because an offender more interested in displaying hostility than in inflicting pain will often not inflict much of it." (Id. at 448 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted], quoting Matter of Philip A., 49 NY2d 198, 200 [1980].) The Court went on to note that in Chiddick, the motive of the defendant (as, again was apparent in the instant case) was to make the complainant release him and thus "the whole point of the bite was to inflict as much pain as he could." (Id.) Indeed, the Court noted, it was unlikely anything other than the infliction of substantial pain would have caused the complainant, "evidently a tenacious man," to release him. (Id.)