In People v. De Bour, 40 NY2d 210, 223, 352 NE2d 562, 386 NYS2d 375 (1976), the Court of Appeals established the graduated four-level test for evaluating the propriety of police conduct in encounters while acting in a law enforcement capacity (see People v. Moore, 6 NY3d 496, 498, 847 NE2d 1141, 814 NYS2d 567 2006). The first level permits a police officer to request information from an individual and merely requires that the request be supported by an objective credible reason, not necessarily indicative of criminality. The second level known as the "common-law right of inquiry" requires a founded suspicion that criminal activity is afoot and permits a somewhat greater intrusion (see People v. Moore, 6 NY3d at 498). The difference between the level-one and level-two encounter is the type and content of questions posed by law enforcement officers (see People v. Hollman, 79 NY2d 181, 190 -191, 590 NE2d 204, 581 NYS2d 619 1992). A level-two "common-law inquiry" permits questions that are accusatory in nature and focuses on the possibility of criminality. A seizure is not permitted under either level one or two (see People v. May, 81 NY2d 725, 728, 609 NE2d 113, 593 NYS2d 760 1992). The third level under DeBour permits a seizure, i.e., a police officer may forcibly stop and detain an individual. However, a seizure is not permitted unless there is reasonable suspicion that an individual is committing, has committed or is about to commit a crime (see People v. Cantor, 36 NY2d at 112). Reasonable suspicion is the quantum of knowledge sufficient to induce an ordinarily prudent and cautious man under the circumstances to believe that criminal activity is at hand (see People v. Cantor, 36 NY2d at 112-113). Finally, the fourth level authorizes an arrest based on probable cause to believe that an individual has committed a crime (see People v. Moore, 6 NY3d at 499). In proceeding with the analysis under De Bour, the court must examine the extent of the intrusion (see People v. De Bour, 40 NY2d at 216). Initially, during oral argument, the defendant argued that the police had effected a stop of a moving vehicle which had to be supported by reasonable suspicion. However, since the defendant's car was stationary alongside the curb and was not moving, the police conduct did not constitute the stop of a moving vehicle (see People v. Harrison, 57 NY2d 470, 475, 443 NE2d 447, 457 NYS2d 199 1982). As such, the police did not need reasonable suspicion to approach the stationary car in order to request information or conduct a common-law inquiry (see People v. Spencer, 84 NY2d 749, 753, 646 NE2d 785, 622 NYS2d 483 1995). The Court set out a four-tiered method for evaluating the propriety of encounters initiated by police officers in their criminal law enforcement capacity. If a police officer seeks simply to request information from an individual, that request must be supported by an objective, credible reason, not necessarily indicative of criminality. The common-law right of inquiry, a wholly separate level of contact, is "activated by a founded suspicion that criminal activity is afoot and permits a somewhat greater intrusion"(People v. De Bour, supra, at 223, 386 NYS2d 375, 352 NE2d 562).