In People v. Eboli (34 NY2d 281 [1974]), the Court of Appeals examined the elements of coercion in the first and second degrees, and noted that they are virtually identical when the coercion is committed by instilling a fear that a person will be physically injured or that property will be damaged. The court specifically rejected the argument that such a statutory scheme denies a defendant due process or the equal protection of the laws, even though it involves "wide prosecutorial discretion." (34 NY2d at 285.) The Eboli court added that a defendant has no constitutional right to elect which of two applicable statutes shall be the basis of his indictment and prosecution. "(34 NY2d at 289.) Thirty-five years ago, that court closed its decision with an observation that goes to the heart of the present issue: "In short, we prefer to recognize the irreducible fact that society is presently relying upon the good judgment of its prosecuting attorneys to charge crimes fairly. If this overall discretion is thought too great, or lacking in sufficient control, the remedy would appear to lie in the creation of general methods, perhaps administrative, to structure and direct that discretion. (See Breitel, Controls in Criminal Law Enforcement, 27 Univ. Chicago L. Rev. 427; Davis, Discretionary Justice, pp. 188-214, 219-222)." (People v. Eboli, 34 NY2d 281, 290.) The Court said that in such a case, where two criminal statutes punish identical conduct, the prosecutor has the discretion whether to charge the higher or lower degree.