In People v Goetz, 68 NY2d 96 (1986) the famous subway shooting case, the Court held that the belief by the defendant that deadly physical force was justified had to be reasonable, not just to him, but to a reasonable person in the defendant's circumstances. The Court in Goetz specifically held that the Legislature declined to follow the Model Penal Code down the path of allowing subjective beliefs to form the basis of a justification defense. In Goetz, the Court of Appeals held that the "justification statute imposes a two-part test which involves both subjective and objective components." The subjective component examines whether the defendant had a genuine belief that the use of force was justified. The objective component examines whether a reasonable person, similarly confronted, would also have held the same belief as the defendant. The Goetz Court, speaking unanimously, noted that the New York Penal Law departed from the Model Penal Code's subjective belief standards: "We cannot lightly impute to the Legislature an intent to fundamentally alter the principles of justification to allow the perpetrator of a serious crime to go free simply because that person believed his actions were reasonable and necessary to prevent some perceived harm. To completely exonerate such an individual, no matter how aberrational or bizarre his thought patterns, would allow citizens to set their own standards for permissible use of force. It would also allow a legally competent defendant suffering from delusions to kill or perform acts of violence with impunity, contrary to fundamental principles of justice and criminal law." (Goetz, supra.) The Court concluded that section 35.15 'retains an objective element' (People v. Goetz, supra, at 112) for assessing the reasonableness of defendant's belief in the necessity for use of deadly force. But, in rejecting the argument that the standard of reasonableness should be purely subjective, the Court emphasized that the statute requires a determination of reasonableness that is both subjective and objective (id., at 113-115). The critical focus must be placed on the particular defendant and the circumstances actually confronting him at the time of the incident, and what a reasonable person in those circumstances and having defendant's background and experiences would conclude (see, 1 CJI[NY] PL 35.00, Introductory Comment, at 848-849). "To determine whether a defendant's conduct was justified under Penal Law 35.15, a two-step inquiry is required. The jury must first determine whether defendant actually believed that deadly physical force was necessary (see, People v. Goetz, supra, at 115). If the People fail to meet their burden of proving that defendant did not actually believe that the use of deadly physical force was necessary, then the jury must move to the second step of the inquiry and assess the reasonableness of this belief (id., at 115). The Court held in Goetz that Penal Law 35.15 requires a jury to consider both subjective and objective factors in determining whether a defendant's conduct was reasonable. We stated that 'a determination of reasonableness must be based on the "circumstances" facing a defendant or his "situation" ... [A] jury should be instructed to consider this type of evidence in weighing the defendant's actions.' (Id., at 114-115.)