People v. Gunatilaka, 156 Misc 2d 958 (Crim. Ct., NY Co. 1993) involved the facial sufficiency of an accusatory instrument charging the Defendant under P.L. section 215.50(3) alleging the violation of a "stay away" clause of a protection order. The order directed the Defendant to "(a) stay away from the home, school, business or place of employment of Prenali Mendis [xxx]-The order did not reflect the location of Prenali Mendis' home, school, business or place of employment." id., p.462. The Court said that: "When the terms of an order are vague and indefinite as to what actions are required or prohibited to a party, he or she may not be adjudged in criminal contempt for failing to take the required action or for taking the prohibited action." id., p.962. The Court dismissed the charge due to the facial insufficiency of the accusatory instrument because the "factual allegations fail to show that the Defendant knew the location was across the street from the protected party's place of business." id., p.963. In People v. Gunatilaka, the Court dismissed the charge of Criminal Contempt in the Second Degree against a defendant who was alleged to have violated an order of protection by walking back and forth on a public street in front of the protected party's place of business. Finding that, among other things, the order of protection did not sufficiently put defendant "on notice" that such acts were prohibited, the Court dismissed the criminal contempt charge. As the Court stated: "In order to find that contempt has occurred in a given case, it must be determined that a lawful order of the court, clearly expressing an unequivocal mandate, was in effect."(Matter of McCormick v. Axelrod, 59 N.Y.2d 574, 583, 453 N.E.2d 508, 466 N.Y.S.2d 279 [1983]; see also, People v. Forman, 145 Misc 2d 115, 546 N.Y.S.2d 755 [Crim Ct, NY County 1989].) When the terms of an order are vague and indefinite as to what actions are required or prohibited to a party, he or she may not be adjudged in criminal contempt for failing to take the required action or for taking the prohibited action. As alleged there is absolutely nothing about defendant's conduct that can be construed as harassing, threatening or intimidating, particularly where there is no showing that the parties were even visible to one another. There is also nothing in the complaint to support a finding that the defendant engaged in the conduct alleged for purposes of harassing, threatening, or intimidating the protected party. Moreover, there is nothing in the order to have put the defendant on notice that the prohibition against such acts included walking back and forth on a public street near to where the complainant worked."