In People v. Jeanty (94 NY2d 507), a sworn juror telephoned the court and stated he had been involved in a car accident, was not feeling well and was going to the hospital. He informed the court a few hours later that he still was not feeling well and did not know when he would return for service. He was dismissed over defendant's objection and replaced by an alternate. In Jeanty (supra), the defendant argued that the newly enacted "two hour rule" only applied if the court could not in any way contact the jurors and afford them an opportunity to explain their absence. However, if the court did ascertain the reason for the jurors' absence then the court was required to wait at least one day. The Jeanty decision flatly rejected that position, noting that the amended statute makes no distinction between jurors who remain out of contact and those who explain their absence. Furthermore, the Court failed to see why out-of-contact jurors should be treated differently than jurors who explain their absence. The Court noted that "both situations delay a trial, and the history of the amendment clearly evinces an intent on the part of the Legislature to avoid delays and to provide precise guidelines to trial courts deciding whether to discharge jurors who fail to appear." (Supra, at 514-515.) The overarching principle of the statute, then, is to reduce delay and conduct trials efficiently and timely. A delay is not mitigated by the fact that the court knows a juror can return the following day, nor is that delay any less burdensome to the rest of the jury simply because the court is aware that the delay is finite. In either case, the primary intent of the Legislature is frustrated. This is particularly true in cases where the jury was specifically instructed as to the length of the trial. Moreover, the Jeanty decision addressed the questions raised by the Practice Commentaries and explained that the use of the word "presume" in the amended statute was "somewhat ambiguous" (supra, at 515). However, the Court noted that to attach to the analysis of the statute the same sort of rebuttable presumption used elsewhere in the law would clearly be at odds with the spirit and intent of the statute. Rather, the Court explained, the word "presume" was meant to connote a conclusion that would permit the juror to be discharged.