In People v. Jelke (1 N.Y.2d 321, 330 [1956]), the Court of Appeals ruled that an attempt is itself already a completed crime under a substantive criminal statute, if "the statutory definition of the essence of a crime is the attempt to do a certain act" . The nature of the attempt is often included in the actual statutory language of the penal provision, as in the statute defining resisting arrest, Penal Law 205.30 ("when he intentionally prevents or attempts to prevent a police officer . . . from effecting an authorized arrest" ); the statute defining obstructing governmental administration, Penal Law 195.05 ("when he . . . prevents or attempts to prevent a public servant from performing an official function" ); the statute defining intimidating a witness in the third degree, Penal Law 215.15 (1) ("when . . . he . . . wrongfully compels or attempts to compel such other person to refrain from communicating such information to any court" ); and the statute defining tampering with a witness in the third degree, Penal Law 215.11 (1) ("when . . . he wrongfully compels or attempts to compel such person to absent himself . . . at such proceeding" ).