In People v. McDonald, 1 NY3d 109 (2003), the New York State Court of Appeals ruled that an attorney's failure to properly advise a defendant of the immigration consequences of his guilty plea could be a basis for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. In that matter, however, the Court denied the defendant's application on the grounds that he failed to "show that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." (1 NY3d at 115.) In following the two prong test enunciated in Strickland, the McDonald court stated that while counsel's "affirmative misrepresentation" regarding whether or not the defendant would be subject to deportation proceedings "falls below an objective standard of reasonableness," the defendant failed to make any showing that he was prejudiced by counsel's misstatement. (1 NY3d at 113-114.) Under McDonald, for a defendant to establish the second prong of the Strickland test, "the sufficiency of defendant's factual allegations as to prejudice should be evaluated with reference to the face of the pleadings, the context of the motion and defendant's access to information." (1 NY3d at 115.) The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of a motion to vacate a plea in a case where it was conceded that Defendant's counsel had given the Defendant inaccurate advice about the deportation consequences of his plea. The Court held that Defendant had not made a prima facie showing of ineffectiveness because Defendant's "affirmation makes no factual allegation that, but for counsel's error, defendant would not have pleaded guilty". (1 NY3d at 115.) Since the second prong of the Strickland test was not satisfied, Defendant's ineffectiveness claim was properly denied. The Court of Appeals held that a defendant may be entitled to post-judgment relief from a plea of guilty that had been entered in actual reliance on an affirmative misstatement by counsel to the effect that the defendant would not be subject to deportation because he was a long-term resident of the United States and his children were American citizens. The court concluded that this erroneous advice by counsel fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and may constitute ineffective assistance of counsel provided there was a reasonable probability that, but for the error, the defendant would not have pleaded guilty. Thus, the immigration consequences of a plea of guilty are collateral, and defense counsel's failure to inform a defendant of the deportation consequences of a plea does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel, but an attorney's affirmative misrepresentation on that subject may fall below an objective standard of reasonableness.