In People v. Nunez (234 A.D.2d 569), the Second Department was presented with the exact issue to be resolved in this case: whether the defendant, who was not the owner of the vehicle, had standing to contest the search of an vehicle in which he was a passenger when the People intended to rely on both the statutory presumption of possession (Penal Law 220.25[1]) and the common law theory of constructive possession. In an unanimous decision, the Second Department held that the "defendant does not have automatic standing because the People did not rely solely on the statutory presumption of possession (Penal Law 220.25[1]), but also on a theory of constructive possession (see, People v. Tejada, 81 N.Y.2d 861, 613 N.E.2d 532, 597 N.Y.S.2d 626; People v. Andrews, 216 A.D.2d 571, 629 N.Y.S.2d 442)" (id., at 569). The court further stated that the defendant lacked standing to challenge the search of the vehicle because the owner of the vehicle, who was in the vehicle at the time of the search, retained the only possessory interest in the automobile and that the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy.