In People v. Osgood (52 N.Y.2d 37 [1980]), the Court of Appeals again set forth these principles, this time in the context of two criminal actions commenced by the filing of felony complaints that were dismissed because of the People's failure to timely proceed on those complaints. The Court of Appeals ruled that each action was commenced, not upon the filing of the indictments sufficient to support the prosecution, but upon the filing of the first accusatory instrument, i.e., the felony complaints. In addition to quoting at some length from its holding in Lomax, the Court of Appeals noted that "it would, of course, be inconsistent, if not perverse, for the Legislature to provide that a statute, designed to insure to the public diligent prosecution of criminal charges filed in court, should be suspended when the District Attorney has inexcusably delayed the prosecution of the case" (People v. Osgood, supra at 41-42, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 215). It also took the opportunity to discredit the People's argument that the filing of the indictment marked the commencement of a new "30.30" period as that argument would apply in the nonfelony context. The Court of Appeals thus noted that, in nonfelony prosecutions, the People's argument would "completely undermine the readiness rule" because, under their theory, the filing of a new accusatory instrument would commence "a new criminal action renewing the statutory period" and allow "additional 'renewals', apparently without limit, unless . . . there was a showing of 'bad faith' in addition to neglect" (id. at 45 n2, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 217). It observed that, in nonfelony cases, there would be no fixed time limit and "the readiness rule would simply be converted into a bad faith rule" (id.). In that regard, the Court of Appeals commented that "[i]t is no answer to say that the speedy trial provisions in other statutes and the Constitution will ultimately fix an outside limit. If the Legislature had found those provisions to be an adequate response to the problem of pretrial delay in the criminal courts, it would not have enacted CPL 30.30" (id.).