In People v. Peque, 22 NY3d 168 [2013] the Court of Appeals struggled to find a home for deportation in the direct/collateral divide. In Peque, in determining that a trial court is constitutionally required to apprise non-citizen defendants of the possibility of deportation prior to entering a guilty plea, the Court found that although deportation is "technically on the collateral side of the direct/collateral divide" it fell within a rare case exception to the usual rule that, if collateral, there is no constitutional duty on a trial court to apprise. (See People v. Peque, 22 NY3d at 192.) In holding that due process still requires a trial court to warn defendant of the immigration consequences of his or her plea, the Court emphasized the "truly unique nature of deportation as a consequence of a guilty plea" and explicitly stated, "there is nothing else quite like it." (Id. at 196.) The Court of Appeals determined, in accordance with the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Padilla v. Kentucky (559 U.S. 356), "that deportation is a plea consequence of such tremendous importance, grave impact and frequent occurrence that a defendant is entitled to notice that it may ensue from a plea." Thus, "to protect the rights of the large number of noncitizen defendants pleading guilty to felonies in New York, trial courts must now make all defendants aware that, if they are not United States citizens, their felony guilty pleas may expose them to deportation" (People v. Peque, 22 NY3d at 197). However, "the trial court's failure to provide such advice does not entitle the defendant to automatic withdrawal or vacatur of the plea" (id. at 176). Instead, "[t]he failure to apprise a defendant of deportation as a consequence of a guilty plea only affects the voluntariness of the plea where that consequence was of such great importance to him that he would have made a different decision had that consequence been disclosed. Therefore, in order to withdraw or obtain vacatur of a plea, a defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that he or she would not have pleaded guilty and would have gone to trial had the trial court informed the defendant of potential deportation. In determining whether the defendant has shown such prejudice, the court should consider, among other things, the favorability of the plea, the potential consequences the defendant might face upon a conviction after trial, the strength of the People's case against the defendant, the defendant's ties to the United States and the defendant's receipt of any advice from counsel regarding potential deportation. This assessment should be made in a commonsense manner, with due regard for the significance that potential deportation holds for many noncitizen defendants. To aid in this undertaking, where possible, the defendant should make every effort to develop an adequate record of the circumstances surrounding the plea at sentencing, which will permit the trial court to efficiently determine the plea's validity and enable appellate review of the defendant's claim of prejudice" (People v. Peque, 22 NY3d at 198-199). The Court indicated that the remedy for such an alleged violation of due process would be for the appellate court to remit the matter to the lower court to afford the defendant the opportunity to move to vacate the plea "and develop a record relevant to the issue of prejudice . . . where the deficiency in the plea allocution appears on the face of the record . . . . Upon a facially sufficient plea vacatur motion, the court should hold a hearing to provide the defendant with an opportunity to demonstrate prejudice." If the defendant can demonstrate prejudice by the defect in the plea allocution upon remittal to the lower court, that court must vacate his plea. "In the absence of a showing of prejudice, the court should amend the judgment of conviction to reflect its ruling on defendant's plea vacatur motion and otherwise leave the judgment undisturbed" (People v. Peque, 22 NY3d at 200-201.)