In People v. Reid (69 N.Y.2d 469, 475, 508 N.E.2d 661, 515 N.Y.S.2d 750 [1987]), the Court concluded in Reid that a claim-of-right defense was not available, reasoning that the defense was codified in the larceny article, but not in the robbery article. Moreover, the statute limits the availability of the defense only to larceny by trespass or embezzlement. Noting the significance of the Legislature's failure to authorize a general claim-of-right defense for extortion, which "entails the threat of actual or potential force or some form of coercion" (69 N.Y.2d at 476), the Court inferred that the Legislature recognized that an accused should not be permitted to invoke the defense in crimes involving force. Indeed, we assumed "that if the Legislature intended to excuse forcible taking, it would have said so" (id.). The Court also explained that, on policy grounds, we were unwilling to expand the area of permissible self-help, finding a meaningful difference between larceny, in which the use of force is a nonissue, and robbery, in which the defendant obtains money allegedly owed to him by threatening or using force.