In People v. Santana (7 NY3d 234, 851 N.E.2d 1193, 818 N.Y.S.2d 842 [2006]), the Court of Appeals applied a general rule that qualifying language found outside of the text of a relevant Penal Law statute is a "proviso," but the court's ultimate conclusion was premised on the belief that the Legislature could not reasonably have intended the People to negate in an information the existence of the myriad labor disputes that would render the contempt statute inapplicable (People v. Davis, 13 NY3d 17, 31, 912 N.E.2d 1044, 884 N.Y.S.2d 665 [2009], citing People v. Santana, 7 NY3d 234, 237, 851 N.E.2d 1193, 818 N.Y.S.2d 842 [2006]). The Court of Appeals addressed this issue and held that if the criminal statute contains an exception as opposed to a proviso, the accusatory instrument must allege that the crime is not within the exception. As a general rule, the People are required to plead and prove that the exception did not exist at the time the crime was committed. A proviso, on the other hand, may be raised as a defense by the defendant, and if he fails to do so, it is waived. In determining whether a provision constitutes an exception or proviso, various courts have considered several factors. Legislative intent to create an exception has generally been found when the exception is clearly defined and incorporated into the specific statute (see People v Santana [criminal contempt in the second degree requires reference to a separate statute to define "labor disputes." In addition, it is unreasonable to expect the People to negate each of the alternatively defined labor disputes in the statute; as such it is a proviso and not an exception]). The Court of Appeals considered whether, given that Penal Law 215.50 (3), by its own terms, does not apply to court orders arising out of labor disputes, an information was jurisdictionally deficient because it did not allege that the crime did not arise from a labor dispute. The Court held that it was not: The labor dispute clause "operates as a proviso that the accused may raise in defense of the charge rather than an exception that must be pleaded by the People in the accusatory instrument." (7 NY3d at 237.) The Court of Appeals emphasized that the determination of whether an exclusion is "a proviso that the accused may raise in defense of the charge rather than an exception that must be pleaded by the People in the accusatory instrument" is ultimately a matter of legislative intent, and an exemption found "entirely within a Penal Law provision" identifies it as an exception "generally" but not exclusively (id.).