In People v Sparber (10 NY3d 457 [2008]), the sentencing court neglected to pronounce the mandated term of postrelease supervision. On appeal, defendant argued that the term of postrelease supervision imposed by DOCS "should be stricken from his sentence and deemed a nullity because 'it was not part of the sentence that the court pronounced orally.' " (Id. at 466.) Defendant Sparber argued that under CPL 440.40 (1) the People have one year from the date of sentence from which they may move for resentencing. The Court of Appeals rejected Sparber's position and held that, although many years had passed after the error in defendant's 2002 sentence, postrelease supervision was a mandatory component of defendant's sentence and the sentencing "error [could] be remedied through resentencing." (Id. at 469) The court stated that "the failure to pronounce the required sentence amounts only to a procedural error, akin to a misstatement or clerical error, which the sentencing court could easily remedy." (Id. at 472) The Court of Appeals decided that the mandated term of postrelease supervision, previously omitted by the court, would be imposed through resentencing by a judge. People v Sparber, rejected the argument that expungement is the proper remedy for a term of postrelease supervision improperly imposed by DOCS. Rather, the Court stated that "[t]he sole remedy for a procedural error such as this is to vacate the sentence and remit for a resentencing hearing so that the trial judge can make the required pronouncement" (10 NY3d at 471). The Court specifically noted that "there exists no procedural bar to allowing the sentencing court to correct its PRS error . . . The failure to pronounce the required sentence amounts only to a procedural error, akin to a misstatement or clerical error, which the sentencing court could easily remedy" (id. at 472). The Court rejected the argument that DOCS's "flawed" administrative imposition of PRS required expungement of the statutory requirement of PRS rather than resentencing of the affected convicted persons: "We conclude that the procedure through which PRS was imposed upon these defendants was flawed as it did not comply with the statutory mandate. To remedy this error, rather than striking PRS from the sentences as urged by defendants, these matters must be remitted to Supreme Court for resentencing and the proper judicial pronouncement of the relevant PRS terms" (10 NY3d at 465). Sparber discussed the available procedural remedies to correct the failure of sentencing courts to impose PRS, settling on resentencing as the sole remedy for such procedural error. In People v Sparber (10 NY3d 457 [2008]), the Court of Appeals determined that the only proper remedy when a court makes a procedural error and fails to pronounce the applicable period of PRS is to vacate the sentence and remit the matter to the sentencing court for proper judicial action. The defendant, however, was not entitled to be relieved of the statutory PRS term (id. at 471). The court further noted that "there exists no procedural bar to allowing the sentencing court to correct its PRS error . . . The failure to pronounce the required sentence amounts only to a procedural error, akin to a misstatement or clerical error, which the sentencing court could easily remedy" (id. at 472). Thus, the orders in each of the cases reviewed on appeal in Sparber were modified to the extent of remitting the cases to the Supreme Court for resentencing (id. at 473). The Court of Appeals had held that imprisoned defendants who challenged the imposition of post-release supervision by non-judicial administrative action but did not seek vacatur of their guilty pleas should be remitted to their sentencing courts for re-sentencing proceedings so that post-release supervision could be included in their sentence by the judge.