In People v. Stith, 69 N.Y.2d 313 [1987] the Court held as a matter of State constitutional law. . .that primary evidence, i e., the 'very evidence...obtained during or as the immediate consequence' of the illegal conduct, would still be subject to exclusion even if it would most likely have been discovered in the course of routine police procedures (69 NY2d, at 318, supra.). However, we recognized that the inevitable discovery exception can validly apply to permit the use of secondary evidence, obtained as a result of information gleaned from or by other exploitation of, the tainted primary evidence ( id., at 319). The Court of Appeals also held that the doctrine's applicability depended on whether it was sought to be applied to "primary" or "secondary" evidence. The Court described primary evidence as evidence "illegally obtained during or as the immediate consequence of the challenged police conduct." (Id. at 318.) In contrast, secondary evidence "was evidence obtained indirectly as a result of leads or information gained from that primary evidence." (Id.) The Court held that primary evidence "i.e. the 'very evidence ... obtained during or as the immediate consequence' of the illegal conduct, would still be subject to exclusion even if it would most likely have been discovered in the course of routine police procedures." (People v Turriago, 90 NY2d 77 [1997] quoting Stith at 318.)