In Policano v. Herbert, 7 NY3d 588 (2006) the Court of Appeals held that New York law had evolved since its 2003 holding in People v. Hafeez to encompass certain concepts regarding depraved indifference murder, specifically, that "a one-on-one shooting or knifing (or similar killing) can almost never qualify as depraved indifference murder" (Policano at 601) and that "a defendant may be convicted of depraved indifference murder when but a single person is endangered in only a few rare circumstances" (id.) The Court also held that retroactive application of these principles would "potentially flood the criminal justice system with CPL 440.10 motions to vacate convictions of culpable intentional murderers who were properly charged under Register and convicted of depraved indifference murder under the law as it existed at the time of their convictions." (Policano at 604.) The Court in Policano denied retroactive application of the Hafeez line of cases based on the three-part test enunciated in People v. Pepper (53 NY2d 213, 220 1981), which requires analysis of "(a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old stand-ards, and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new standards." The second and third factors are only given substantial weight "when the answer to the retroactivity question is not to be found in the purpose of the new rule itself." (Id.). Policano found that the purpose of the new rule, which was focused on making future prosecutions more sustainable, gave the compelling answer to whether retroactivity was applicable. The Court, quoting People v. Suarez (6 NY3d 202, 217-218 2005), noted that "defendants who commit vicious crimes but who may have been charged and convicted under the wrong section of the statute are not attractive candidates for collateral relief after their convictions have become final." (Policano at 604.) The Court further held that nonretroactivity would pose no danger of a miscarriage of justice. (Id.) The Court applied the three-part Pepper test when deciding whether our new depraved indifference standard applied retroactively to a case brought by collateral attack (id. at 603-604; see People v Pepper, 53 NY2d 213, 423 NE2d 366, 440 NYS2d 889 (1981)). The Court held that the existing law should not be applied on collateral review to defendants whose convic-tions became final prior to our new interpretation of the law of depraved indifference murder. In Policano, we recognized that to allow retroactive application of existing law to final convictions "would mean that every defendant to whose case it was relevant, no matter how remote in time and merit, would become a beneficiary" (Pepper, 53 NY2d at 222; see Policano, 7 NY3d at 604). The Court specifically noted our concern for congesting the courts with a multitude of motions by defendants with long-standing final convictions (Policano, 7 NY3d at 604).