In Rosenstiel v Rosenstiel, 20 AD2d 71 [1st Dept 1963] the petitioner husband and respondent wife lived together in the matrimonial domicile until the petitioner moved out due to marital problems. While a divorce action was pending, the respondent remained in possession and petitioner attempted to evict her as a licen-see. The Appellate Division held that the respondent wife did not qualify as a licensee and therefore could not be evicted in a summary proceeding. The holding was based upon the premise that respondent wife's posses-sion of the subject premises was not by virtue of her husband's "permission," but rather "because of special rights incidental to the marriage contract and relationship" (id. at 76). So long as the marriage relationship remains intact, a spouse has "the obligation by virtue thereof to support and maintain" his or her spouse (id. at 77). The Appellate Division refused to permit a husband to employ a summary proceeding under RPAPL 713 to evict his wife given the absence of "a clear manifestation of legislative intent to render the statute so applicable." Such a manifestation of legislative intent was necessary, according to the Court, because the Legislature, having enacted the Domestic Relations Law, the CPLR and the Family Court Act, codified certain rights, ob-ligations and remedies affecting "a husband and wife, one to the other," and specifically conferred general jurisdiction over the marital relationship onto Supreme Court and Family Court, "which are properly fitted and equipped to handle the myriad of problems which may arise out of a family relationship." ( Rosenstiel v Rosenstiel, supra, 20 AD2d at 73.) The Appellate Division explained: "The use and possession of the family home is so essentially a part of the jurisdiction and responsibility of [Supreme Court and Family Court] in family matters that, had the Legislature intended to confer upon other courts [i.e., Civil Court of the City of New York] jurisdiction over such use and possession, it is clear that it would have made its intent in this regard plainly known ... In fact, if the husband were so enabled to secure the physical removal of his wife and family from the marital home by means of a summary proceeding pros-ecuted by him, he could thereby in effect obtain in such courts of limited jurisdiction a separation from his wife without in any way submitting to the jurisdiction of the tribunals having general cognizance of family affairs ... It is inconceivable that the Legislature would enact a law having this effect." ( Rosenstiel v Rosenstiel, supra, 20 AD2d at 73-74.)