In Solnick v. Whalen, 49 NY2d 224, the Court of Appeals held that in order to determine whether there is a period of limitation prescribed by law for the commencement of a particular declaratory judgment action, it is necessary to examine the substance of that action to identify the relationship out of which the claim arises and the relief sought. The court reasoned that if factors revealed that the parties' rights were open to a forum or proceeding for which a specific limitation period is statutorily provided, then that period limits the time for the commencement of the declaratory judgment action. In Solnick, supra, the plaintiffs challenged the retroactive adjustment of certain Medicaid reimbursement rates seeking to an order declaring the retroactive adjustment as null and void, and an order adjoining the defendants from attempting to withhold any current Medicaid payments. The Court held that while the plaintiffs brought a "declaratory judgment" action challenging the determination of the Commissioner of Health adjusting Medicaid reimbursement rates for lack of due process, the action was in fact time-barred as it was brought less than four months after notification of the adjusted reimbursement rates. The Court reasoned that the challenge would have been barred by the four-month limitation period of a CPLR article 78 proceeding, (CPLR 217), which was an alternate form of judicial proceeding available to the plaintiffs, and the mere fact that plaintiff's challenge to the defendant's determination was stated in terms of a "constitutional objection", to wit, "violation of due process", did not serve to make an article 78 proceeding, the customary vehicle for review of administrative determinations, unavailable. (Id.)