In Watt v. Irish (184 Misc 2d 413 [Sup Ct, Columbia County 2000, Cannizzaro, J.], the plaintiffs contracted with the defendant builder for construction of a new home on land the plaintiffs already owned. After the home was completed, the plaintiffs took up residency, and discovered problems with the construction. They sued the builder approximately 5 1/2 years after completion of construction, claiming that the builder breached the contract by constructing their home in a negligent manner. The defendant builder moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, arguing that plaintiffs' cause of action was barred by the two-year limitations period set forth in General Business Law 777-a, as well as their failure to provide the defendant with timely written notice of breach of statutory warranty required as a condition precedent to an action under that law. The plaintiffs opposed the motion, contending that new housing implied warranty statute did not apply, because their action concerned the construction of a new home on land the plaintiffs owned at the time of the construction contract. Hence, neither statutory written notice of claim requirement nor the abbreviated two-year limitations period applied to bar plaintiffs' action. The court in Watt agreed with the plaintiff homeowners, finding that the new home warranty statute "only applies to contracts or agreements that involve the sale of new homes," not merely construction of new homes on land already titled to the owner (184 Misc 2d at 414-415 ). The court employed two decisional devices to reach that conclusion. First, it looked at the history of the statute in the context of the decisional law both before and after its enactment. Accordingly, the court in Watt implied, the statute was intended to reach no further than the situation --application of the doctrine of merger to extinguish any implied warranty upon passing of title at closing. Secondly, the court in Watt found the language of the statute supporting its reading of statutory intent. The statute directs that "a housing merchant implied warranty is implied in the contract or agreement for the sale of a new home and shall survive the passing of title." (General Business Law 777-a [1] .) It refers to the beneficiary of the warranty as the "owner," defined as "the first person to whom the home is sold and, during the unexpired portion of the warranty period, each successor in title to the home and any mortgagee in possession" (General Business Law 777 [6] ). And finally, the statute defines "warranty date," the date the warranty period begins, as the "date of the passing of title to the first owner for occupancy by such owner or such owner's family as a residence, or the date of first occupancy of the home as a residence, whichever first occurs" (General Business Law 777 [8]). The court concluded that "the housing merchant implied warranty statute ... only applies to contracts or agreements for the sale of new homes," which requires "a sale and passing of title" (184 Misc.2d at 414-415.)