In Yonkers Contr. Co. v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp. (93 N.Y.2d 375, 712 N.E.2d 678, 690 N.Y.S.2d 512 1999), the Court addressed whether the requirement for bringing an action against the Port Authority within one year under McKinney's Unconsolidated Laws of NY 7107 (L 1950, ch 301, 7) was a condition precedent to suit or a statute of limitations. In concluding that the statute contained a condition precedent to suit, we observed that section 7107 was a single enactment of the Legislature both consenting to suits against the Port Authority and incorporating a timeliness requirement as "an integral part of its waiver of sovereign immunity" (93 N.Y.2d at 379, 712 N.E.2d 678, 690 N.Y.S.2d 512). The Court underscored that if a statute not only creates a cause of action but also attaches a time limitation to its commencement, then "time is an ingredient of the cause" (id). In Yonkers the Court held that the one year time period for commencing a lawsuit against the Port Authority, contained in McKinney's Unconsolidated Laws of NY 7107 (L 1950, ch 301, 7), was a condition precedent that could not be tolled by CPLR 205. Section 7107 reads: "The foregoing consent is granted upon the condition that any suit, action or proceeding prosecuted or maintained under this act shall be commenced within one year after the cause of action therefor shall have accrued, and upon the further condition that in the case of any suit, action or proceeding for the recovery or payment of money, prosecuted or maintained under this act, a notice of claim shall have been served upon the port authority by or on behalf of the plaintiff or plaintiffs at least sixty days before such suit, action or proceeding is commenced. The provisions of this section shall not apply to claims arising out of provisions of any workmen's compensation law of either state." In Yonkers, this Court distinguished between a statute of limitations and a statutory time restriction for commencing a lawsuit. There, this Court stated: "The former merely suspends the remedy provided by a right of action, but the latter conditions the existence of a right of action, thereby creating a substantive limitation on the right (93 N.Y.2d at 378). The Court determined that the time in which to sue was a condition for bringing the lawsuit.