In Zanghi v. Niagara Frontier Transp. Comn. (85 N.Y.2d 423 [1995]), the Court of Appeals restated its holding in Cooper v. City of New York (81 NY2d 584, 619 N.E.2d 369, 601 N.Y.S.2d 432 [1993]) with respect to the application of the firefighter's rule to a cause of action in common-law negligence. Pursuant to the firefighter's rule as set forth in Cooper (supra), , "police officers may not recover in common-law negligence for line-of-duty injuries resulting from risks associated with the particular dangers inherent in that type of employment . . . The scope of the bar to recovery, the High Court concluded, is that the firefighter rule precludes a police officer . . . from recovering in tort when the performance of his . . . duties increased the risk of the injury happening, and did not merely furnish the occasion for the injury." (Zanghi at 436.) The Court in Zanghi (supra at 439) further noted that "continued application of the bar is presently grounded on the public policy against awarding damages to . . . police for hazards 'that create a need for their services' and which they are hired, specially trained and compensated to confront." The "determinative factor," the Court noted, in applying the firefighter rule's bar is "whether the injury sustained is related to the particular dangers which police officers . . . are expected to assume as part of their duties . . . The necessary connection is present where the performance of the police officer's . . . duties increased the risk of the injury happening, and did not merely furnish the occasion for the injury. In other words, where some act taken in furtherance of a specific police . . . function exposed the officer to a heightened risk of sustaining the particular injury, he or she may not recover damages for common-law negligence." (Id. at 439.)