In In re Higgins, 160 N.C. App. 704, 706, 587 S.E.2d 77, 78 (2003), the petitioner appealed from an order in which the superior court declined to find the respondent to be incompetent. Id. at 705-06, 587 S.E.2d at 77-78. Respondent died during the pendency of the appeal. Id. at 706, 587 S.E.2d at 79. Our Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the action abated upon the death of the respondent. Id. at 707, 587 S.E.2d at 79. The death of a party while an appeal is pending does not automatically render the appeal moot. See N.C.R. App. P. 38 ("No action abates by reason of the death of a party while an appeal may be taken or is pending, if the cause of action survives."). A cause of action does not survive if "the relief sought could not be enjoyed, or granting it would be nugatory after death." N.C. Gen. Stat. 28A-18-1(b)(3) (2007). Thus, in determining what effect granting Andrew Nebenzahl's requested relief would have on this matter, we must, as set forth in Higgins, consider the primary purpose "of incompetency proceedings for adults to determine whether the death of the respondent obviates that purpose." Higgins, 160 N.C. App. at 707, 587 S.E.2d at 78. In Higgins, our Court explained that the main purpose of incompetency proceedings for adults is to determine whether a guardian is needed to help individuals exercise their rights and to make decisions on their behalf when the individuals are incapable of doing so. Id. at 707, 587 S.E.2d at 79. Our Court held that "a petition to declare a respondent incompetent does not survive the death of the respondent under N.C. Gen. Stat. 28A-18-1. Thus, the appeal abated upon the . . . death of the respondent. The appeal has become moot and is accordingly dismissed." Id.