In State v. Brooks 178 N.C. App. 211, 215, 631 S.E.2d 54, 57 (2006), the defendant was convicted of felonious breaking or entering and felonious larceny in a law office. Id. at 212, 631 S.E.2d at 56. This Court held that the defendant had implied consent to enter the reception area of the law office, which was open to the public. Id. at 215, 631 S.E.2d at 57. The defendant testified that he distracted a secretary while his accomplice stole an attorney's day planner and wallet from the attorney's office. Id. at 213, 631 S.E.2d at 56. The Court held that the defendant had the firm's implied consent to enter the reception area of the "law office[,] which was open to members of the public seeking legal assistance" and "where members of the public were generally welcome . . . ." Id. at 215, 631 S.E.2d at 57. However, this consent was rendered "void ab initio when he went into areas of the firm that were not open to the public so that he could commit a theft . . . ." Id. In State v. Brooks, 51 N.C. App. 90, 96, 275 S.E.2d 202, 206 (1981) the Court stated: Probable cause "particularized" to those present on the premises being searched can be clearly inferred from the circumstances under which the limited search pursuant to G.S. 15A-256 is authorized: Police officers have reason to believe that criminal activity has been or is occurring on the premises, the search pursuant to the warrant fails to uncover any evidence of such activity and such evidence of the criminal activity could be concealed upon the person of those present at the time of the officer's entry. Therefore, probable cause exists from the fact that a search pursuant to a search warrant failed to yield the items sought and that the defendant found on the premises could have concealed those items on his person. Probable cause does not arise from defendant's mere presence on the premises. The State's reading of the statute would eliminate the requirement that "the search pursuant to the warrant fails to uncover evidence of such activity." Id. Without this statutory requirement, G.S. 15A-256 would entitle officers to search individuals merely because they were found on the premises. The U.S. Supreme Court has already held that proposition unconstitutional. G.S. 15A-256 states: An officer executing a warrant directing a search of premises not generally open to the public or of a vehicle other than a common carrier may detain any person present for such time as is reasonably necessary to execute the warrant. If the search of such premises or vehicle and of any persons designated as objects of the search in the warrant fails to produce the items named in the warrant, the officer may then search any person present at the time of the officer's entry to the extent reasonably necessary to find property particularly described in the warrant which may be concealed upon the person, but no property of a different type from that particularly described in the warrant may be seized or may be the basis for prosecution of any person so searched. For the purpose of this section all controlled substances are the same type of property. The warrant gave the officers the right to search the premises for "ready to sell" hashish. Id. at 92, 275 S.E.2d at 203. Upon conducting the search, the officers found no hashish that was not ready for immediate sale, though they found hashish not yet ready to sell. Id. The officers then searched the defendant and found an envelope of hashish. Id. The Brooks Court sustained the search based on G.S. 15A-256, reasoning that the officers' search of the premises did not disclose the intended items, namely "ready to sell" hashish. Id. at 94, 275 S.E.2d at 204.