In State v. Crumbley, 135 N.C. App. 59, 66, 519 S.E.2d 94, 99 (1999), the trial court orally rendered judgment sentencing the defendant to concurrent terms of imprisonment; however, as here, the written judgment entered at a later date by the trial court provided that the sentences would run consecutively. In Crumbley, we held that the trial court erred and rejected the State's argument there was no error because the defendant was present in open court at the time the sentence was originally rendered. The Court reasoned that "the substantive change in the sentence could only be made in the Defendant's presence, where the defendant or his attorney would have an opportunity to be heard." Crumbley, 135 N.C. App. at 67, 519 S.E.2d at 99. The Court concluded that "because there is no indication in this record that Defendant was present at the time the written judgment was entered, the sentence must be vacated and this matter remanded for the entry of a new sentencing judgment." Id. at 66, 519 S.E.2d at 99. In State v. Crumbley, 135 N.C. App. 59, 519 S.E.2d 94 (1999), the trial court imposed multiple sentences on the defendant, but in open court did not indicate whether those sentences should run concurrently or consecutively. Id. at 61, 519 S.E.2d at 96. Subsequently, a written judgment was entered stating that the sentences would run consecutively. Id. The Court observed that the legal effect of the oral judgment was that the prison sentences should run concurrently. Id. at 67, 519 S.E.2d at 99. See N.C. Gen. Stat. 15A-1354(a) (2007) ("If not specified or not required by statute to run consecutively, sentences shall run concurrently."). According to Crumbley, the written judgment's "substantive change in the sentence to consecutive sentences could only be made in the Defendant's presence, where he and/or his attorney would have an opportunity to be heard." 135 N.C. App. at 67, 519 S.E.2d at 99. Crumbley directs that "because there is no indication in this record that Defendant was present at the time the written judgment was entered, the sentence must be vacated and this matter remanded for the entry of a new sentencing judgment." Id. at 66, 519 S.E.2d at 99.