In State v. Hunter, 290 N.C. 556, 227 S.E.2d 535 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1093, 51 L. Ed. 2d 539, 97 S. Ct. 1106 (1977), our Supreme Court quoted with approval language from Manning v. Roanoke & T. R. R. Co., 122 N.C. 824, 828, 28 S.E. 963, 964 (1898), stating that North Carolina law "forbids the courts from allowing non-resident counsel . . . from practicing habitually in our courts." Furthermore, N.C. Gen. Stat. 84-4.1 speaks of the admission pro hac vice of attorneys, not law firms. Neither this language in Hunter nor the statutory language indicates an intent to summarily deprive all members of an out-of-state law firm--whether present or future--the opportunity to appear in our state courts on a pro hac vice basis, where a single member of the firm may have appeared in our courts on multiple occasions such that a determination is made that the individual has habitually practiced law in this state. The quoted language speaks to the individual "non-resident counsel," and should not impugn to the firm the disqualification of the individual. Judge Griffin's order was based at least in part on his finding that "the Gary Law Firm (and its members) has habitually practiced law in North Carolina," and Judge Griffin concluded that "the conduct of the Gary Law Firm and its members in North Carolina constitutes the habitual practice of law." The Court disagreed with the implication that a law firm, as opposed to an individual member of a law firm, may be admitted pro hac vice to practice before our courts, or that a law firm can be found to have habitually practiced law in North Carolina. To the extent Judge Griffin's order was based upon this conclusion of law, the Court believed the order constitutes an abuse of discretion.