In State v. Johnson, 337 N.C. 212, 221, 446 S.E.2d 92, 97 (1994), the Court reasoned that "after the victim's life was threatened, it was not necessary to remove him from one room to another in order to commit the robbery." Id. Moreover, the Court reasoned that "the evidence showed clearly that the victim was exposed to further danger by his removal and further restraint in the living room." Id. It is the rule in North Carolina that the price paid at voluntary sales of land, similar in nature, location, and condition to the condemnee's land, is admissible as independent evidence of the value of the land taken if the prior sale was not too remote in time. State v. Johnson, 282 N.C. 1, 21, 191 S.E.2d 641, 655 (1972). The Court conclude that plaintiff's reliance on the "prior sale" language is misguided. A careful reading of Johnson reveals that our Supreme Court intended to attribute no significance to the word "prior." In Johnson, , three purportedly comparable sales were used to assess the value of condemned land. Id. at 8, 191 S.E.2d at 649. One of these sales occurred after the date of taking. Id. Ultimately, however, the Supreme Court did not exclude this sale because it post-dated the taking, instead excluding it because it was sold to a prospective condemnor and thus was not truly a voluntary sale. Id. at 23, 191 S.E.2d at 656. Had our Supreme Court intended the "prior sale" language to affirmatively establish a requirement that all comparable sales must pre-date the taking, it surely would have used that requirement to exclude the one post-taking sale there.