In State v. Smith, 40 N.C. App. 72, 252 S.E.2d 535 (1979), defendant was convicted of voluntary manslaughter. The victim, defendant's wife, was found dead in their home on the morning of 17 December. Smith, 40 N.C. App. at 73, 252 S.E.2d at 536. The Smith defendant made a statement to the police in which he stated that he was at his home with his wife for the entire night of 16 December. Thus, the defendant's statement placed him at the "scene of the crime and in the company of the victim." Id. at 81, 252 S.E.2d at 541. Although defendant denied killing his wife and asserted that his statements were exculpatory as they tended "to show that someone else may have had the opportunity to kill" her, we described the defendant's statement as "in the nature of an admission." Smith, 40 N.C. App. at 83-84, 252 S.E.2d at 541. In State v. Smith, 315 N.C. 76, 92, 337 S.E.2d 833, 844 (1985), our Supreme Court held that prior to admitting or denying proffered hearsay evidence pursuant to Rule 803(24), the trial court must determine that: (1) proper written notice was given to the adverse party; (2) the hearsay statement is not specifically covered by any other hearsay exception; (3) the proffered statement possesses circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness; (4) the proffered evidence is offered as evidence of a material fact; (5) the proffered evidence is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; (6) the proffered evidence will best serve the general purposes of the rules of evidence and the interests of justice. Smith, 315 N.C. at 92-97, 337 S.E.2d at 844-847. In State v. Smith, 315 N.C. 76, 337 S.E.2d 833 (1985), our Supreme Court outlined six specific questions and their explanation pursuant to Rule 803(24) (now codified as Rule 804(b)(5)) which a trial court must answer in its determination of whether to admit hearsay testimony. They are: [1] Has proper notice been given? [Where the] testimony is sought to be admitted as substantive evidence under Rule 803(24), the proponent must first provide written notice to the adverse party . . . . [2] Is the hearsay not specifically covered elsewhere? If the trial judge determines that the statement is covered by one of the other specific exceptions, that exception, not . . . [this one] governs . . . and the inquiry must end. . . . [3] Is the statement trustworthy? This threshold determination has been called "the most significant requirement" of admissibility under [this exception]. . . . Among the[] factors [to be considered] are (1) assurance of personal knowledge of the declarant of the underlying event . . .;(2) the declarant's motivation to speak the truth or otherwise . . .;(3) whether the declarant ever recanted the testimony . . .;and (4) the practical availability of the declarant at trial for meaningful cross-examination. . . . None of these factors, alone or in combination, may conclusively establish or discount the statement's "circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness." The trial judge should focus upon the factors that bear on the declarant at the time of making the out-of-court statement and should keep in mind that the peculiar factual context within which the statement was made will determine its trustworthiness. [4] Is the statement material? [The statement must be] ". . . offered as evidence of a material fact." [N.C. Gen. Stat. 8C-1, Rules 401 and 402.] [5] Is the statement more probative on the issue than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts? The requirement [of necessity] imposes the obligation of a dual inquiry: were the proponent's efforts to procure more probative evidence diligent, and is the statement more probative on the point than other evidence that the proponent could reasonably procure? . . . [6] Will the interests of justice be best served by admission? [As] set out in N.C.G.S. 8C-1, Rule 102, [the general purpose of the Evidence Code is] . . . to secure fairness in administration, elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion of growth and development of the law of evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined." Smith, 315 N.C. at 92-96, 337 S.E.2d at 844-47 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).