In State v. Proctor, 58 N.C. App. 631, 635, 294 S.E.2d 240, 243 (1982), the defendant was charged with trafficking in cocaine pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. 90-95(h)(3). The defendant filed a motion for a bill of particulars requesting the State specifically identify the controlled substance at issue. Id. The State complied and stated "the substance was 'cocaine which is a derivative of coca leaves.'" Id. The defendant subsequently filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that "a derivative of coca leaves" was not included in the language of N.C. Gen. Stat. 90-95(h)(3). Id. The Court duly noted that N.C. Gen. Stat. 90-95(h)(3) omitted certain language included in the definition of cocaine contained in N.C. Gen. Stat. 90-90(a)4, part of the schedule for controlled substances. Id. at 634, 294 S.E.2d at 242. N.C. Gen. Stat. 90-90(a)4 is now codified as N.C. Gen. Stat. 90-90(1)d. N.C. Gen. Stat. 90-90(a)4 included in its definition: "(1) coca leaves; (2) any salts, compound, derivative or preparation of coca leaves; (3) any salts, compound, derivative or preparation thereof which is chemically equivalent or identical with any of these substances . . . ." Id. At the time the defendant was charged, the trafficking in cocaine statute omitted the second group contained in N.C. Gen. Stat. 90-90(a)4. Id. This omission created uncertainty regarding what was included in the trafficking in cocaine statute. Id. The Court held that "the full definition of cocaine in G.S. 90-90(a)4 may be read into the trafficking in cocaine provisions of G.S. 90-95(h)(3)" and further stated: The purpose of G.S. 90-95(h)(3) would not be served - indeed, it would be thwarted - by a more restrictive definition of cocaine than that in G.S. 90-90(a)4. Under these circumstances, we believe that the purpose of the trafficking statute must be given effect even if the strict letter thereof must be disregarded in order to do so. The schedules of controlled substances set forth in G.S. 90-89 through 90-94 and all the subsections of G.S. 90-95 deal with the same subject matter, violations of the Controlled Substances Act. Statutes dealing with the same subject matter are to be construed in pari materia. Id. at 635, 294 S.E.2d at 243. However, the Court carefully limited its holding to "those circumstances" and articulated the reasoning behind its decision. Id. The Court stated, "it is apparent to us that the omission of the second group listed in G.S. 90-90(a)4 from the language of G.S. 90-95(h)(3) was not a deliberate choice by the legislature since it results in an incomplete and confusing definition for the crime of trafficking in cocaine." Id. at 634, 294 S.E.2d at 242.