State v. Wilkerson

In State v. Wilkerson, 356 N.C. 418, 571 S.E.2d 583 (2002), two witnesses testified regarding the facts surrounding the defendant's prior conviction. Wilkerson, 148 N.C. App. at 311, 559 S.E.2d at 6. A deputy clerk then testified regarding the defendant's convictions for prior drug charges. Id. The defendant did not testify. Id. Our Supreme Court, in adopting Judge Wynn's dissent, established that, "in a criminal prosecution, the State may not introduce prior crimes evidence under Rule 404(b) by introducing the bare fact that the defendant was previously convicted of a crime . . . ." Id., 148 N.C. App. at 327, 559 S.E.2d at 16. Based on Judge Wynn's dissent, the defendant was entitled to a new trial. The jury convicted defendant of possession with intent to sell or deliver cocaine and trafficking in cocaine. Wilkerson, 148 N.C. App. at 312, 559 S.E.2d at 6. Defendant did not testify. Id. The State sought to introduce evidence of defendant's prior convictions under N.C. Gen. Stat. 8C-1, Rule 404(b). Id. at 312, 559 S.E.2d at 7. Because the State sought to introduce defendant's prior convictions under a rule of evidence, the Wilkerson court analyzed whether admitting defendant's prior convictions into evidence was proper under Rule 404(b). Id. The Supreme Court of North Carolina adopted Judge Wynn's dissent, in which Judge Wynn stated that the admission of the bare fact of a defendant's prior conviction violates Rule 404(b) and Rule 403. Id. at 327-28, 559 S.E.2d at 16. However, Judge Wynn stated that our Courts have recognized a categorical exception to this rule in second-degree murder cases where prior traffic-related convictions may be introduced to show malice. Id. In Wilkerson, the dissent, which was adopted by our the Supreme Court of North Carolina, recognized that introducing the bare fact of a prior conviction under Rule 404(b) fails to satisfy the Rule 403 balancing test, as the only fair interpretation of the purpose behind the State's introduction of such evidence is impermissible: that the evidence is being offered to show the defendant's predisposition to commit the crime charged. Id. at 328, 559 S.E.2d at 16. The dissent further recognized that the admission of the bare fact of a prior conviction is prejudicial: Because the jury was permitted to infer the defendant's intent to sell or deliver the cocaine from the bare fact of his prior convictions, I cannot say that the introduction of those prior convictions was harmless error as to his current conviction for possession with intent to sell or deliver cocaine. Furthermore, as the jury was allowed to infer from his prior convictions the defendant's knowledge of his possession of the cocaine, as well as his intent to control the cocaine, I cannot say that introduction of those convictions was harmless error as to his conviction for trafficking in cocaine. The defense was inescapably tainted and unfairly prejudiced by the admission of the defendant's prior convictions, despite (or indeed as a result of) the independent evidence of the defendant's knowledge and intent elicited from Officer Pyrtle and Agent Long. Id. at 328-29, 559 S.E.2d at 16-17.