In Thompson v. Newman, 101 N.C. App. 385, 399 S.E.2d 407 (1991), aff'd in part, vacated in part on other grounds, 331 N.C. 709, 417 S.E.2d 224 (1992), the Court held that a prospective oral statement of intent to dismiss a case voluntarily was not sufficient to constitute a voluntary dismissal under Rule 41(a). In Thompson, plaintiff's counsel stated, "we're going to take a voluntary dismissal without prejudice." The statement "was ambiguous in the absence of additional evidence as to whether plaintiffs' attorney was in fact taking a voluntary dismissal or was merely expressing an intention to do so." Id. at 389, 399 S. E. 2d at 409. Appellants also rely on the case of Hyde Constr. Co. v. Koehring Co., 388 F.2d 501 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 905, 20 L. Ed. 2d 419, 88 S. Ct. 1654 (1968). In Hyde Constr. Co. v. Koehring Co., 388 F.2d 501 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 905, 20 L. Ed. 2d 419, 88 S. Ct. 1654 (1968), the plaintiff filed a motion in opposition to a change of venue, and also filed notice that if venue were changed, the action would be voluntarily dismissed. The trial court in Hyde denied plaintiff's motion and dismissed the action. The Circuit Court of Appeals reasoned that the Hyde plaintiff's statement amounted to a "conditional notice of dismissal which is not within the scope of Rule 41(a)(1)." Hyde, 388 F.2d at 507.