In Jackson v. Greger (2006) 110 Ohio St.3d 488, 2006 Ohio 4968, 854 N.E.2d 487, paragraph one of the syllabus, the Supreme Court held: "R.C. 2317.02(A) provides the exclusive means by which privileged communications directly between an attorney and a client can be waived. (State v. McDermott, 72 Ohio St.3d 570, 1995 Ohio 80, 651 N.E.2d 985, followed.)" In Jackson, the client sued her former attorney for malpractice upon learning that her guilty plea in the matter in which he had represented her would bar her action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 against the arresting officers and the prosecuting city. The former counsel sought all attorney-client communications and documentation related to the Section 1983 action. The trial court granted the former attorney's motion to compel. The court of appeals applied the three-part test for implied waiver of the attorney-client privilege set forth in Hearn v. Rhay (E.D.Wash.1975), 68 F.R.D. 574. According to the Hearn test, a client impliedly waives the attorney-client privilege when: (1) assertion of the privilege was a result of some affirmative act, such as filing suit, by the asserting party; (2) through this affirmative act, the asserting party put the protected information at issue by making it relevant to the case; (3) application of the privilege would have denied the opposing party access to information vital to his defense." Id. at 581. The Ohio Supreme Court reversed and stated: "'In Ohio, the attorney-client privilege is governed by statute, R.C. 2317.02(A), and in cases that are not addressed in R.C. 2317.02(A), by common law.' State ex rel. Leslie v. Ohio Hour. Fin. Agency, 105 Ohio St. 3d 261, 2005 Ohio 1508, P18, 824 N.E.2d 990. The Court stated that the statutory privilege governs communications directly between an attorney and a client." Id.