Mitchell v. Lawson Milk Co

In Mitchell v. Lawson Milk Co. (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 190, 192, 532 N.E.2d 753, the claims arose out of a hold-up at a convenience store during which Mary Mitchell was fatally shot. The administrator of her estate brought suit, alleging that the store "contained no alarms, protective glass, cameras or other security devices" and that her employer had failed to provide training or instruction on handling violent situations. The complaint further alleged that the employer knew or should have known that its employees were subject to armed robberies, that the employer engaged in intentional misconduct, and that it knew or should have known that injury was substantially certain to occur. On review, the Ohio Supreme Court found the allegations to be deficient, stating: "Taking the facts of the complaint as true and construing them in Mitchell's favor, those facts fail to establish a claim for intentional tort. The facts are easy to grasp and are undisputed: a death resulted from the hold-up of a convenience store. Even if Lawson failed to equip its stores with security devices or provide its employees with training in handling violent situations, it does not follow that Lawson knew that injury to its employees was certain, or substantially certain, to result. This is so, even if we assume that the Lawson store was in a high-crime-rate area. "Unsupported conclusions that appellant committed an intentional tort are not taken as admitted by a motion to dismiss and are not sufficient to withstand such a motion. This principle is important in resolving claims of intentional tort against an employer. Virtually every injury in the workplace can be made the basis for a claim of intentional tort if the unsupported conclusion that the employer intended to injure the employee is allowed to prevail over factual allegations which preclude the possibility of intentional tort. We do not serve the interest of employees, employers or the administration of justice in the already over-docketed courts of Ohio if we permit claims to go forward which, on the face of the pleading, have no chance of success." Id. at 192-93