An injured worker cannot raise one theory, either occupational disease or injury, in her original claim and another on appeal. In Mull v. Jeep Corporation (1983), 13 Ohio App.3d 426, 13 Ohio B. 514, 469 N.E.2d 923, the Sixth District Court of Appeals considered the issue as follows: The overall scheme of the workers' compensation statutes provides that a given claim be heard and reviewed three times in the administrative process and, if an appeal is taken pursuant to R.C. 4123.519, also heard in the court of common pleas. This court has previously held that where an issue has not been raised and decided in the administrative process, the issue may not be raised for the first time on appeal to the court of common pleas. See Lorene Scott v. Chevrolet Motor Division (Dec. 9, 1983), Lucas App. No. L-83-272, 1983 Ohio App, unreported; Linder v. Ford Motor Co. (July 8, 1983), Lucas App. No. L-83-107, 1983 Ohio App, unreported. To allow a claimant or employer to raise an issue for the first time in an appeal to the court of common pleas would frustrate the statutory system for having issues raised and decided through the administrative process. While we do not believe that the principle that all issues must first be raised before the Industrial Commission should be extended to cover any and all procedural, evidentiary, or legal issues, said principle must apply to an issue as significant as the difference between an injury and an occupational disease. The statutory and case law have developed clear guidelines to distinguish between the two. In contrast to the definitions of an "occupational disease" discussed supra, the definition of an "injury" is provided for in a separate statutory section (R.C. 4123.01C), and the law provides for a very different kind of analysis when considering an injury. Mull, 13 Ohio App.3d at 428-429.