In State v. Adams, 43 Ohio St. 3d 67, 538 N.E.2d 1025 (1989), the State charged the defendant with a violation of Section 4511.19(A)(3). Adams, 43 Ohio St. 3d at 67. After the State entered a nolle prosequi as to that charge, it charged him with a violation of Section 4511.19(A)(1), for which the State had a 90-day speedy trial deadline. Id. The Ohio Supreme Court wrote that, because both charges arose from the same set of facts, the same 90-day speedy trial period applied to both of them. Id. at 68. The defendant was initially charged with a violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(3) for having a specified amount of alcohol concentration on his breath. Adams, 43 Ohio St.3d at 67. Based on the same facts and circumstances, the defendant was later charged with a violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1) for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. The trial court found that the speedy trial waiver executed with respect to the first charge extended to the later charge because the two charges fell under the state statute and generally involved the same conduct. Id. at 69. That decision was affirmed on appeal. The Supreme Court later reversed, however, concluding that Adams' waiver to the second charge was not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently made because the charges were distinctly different from one another, so much so that they "could involve different defenses at the time of trial." Id. Accordingly, the Court determined that Adams could not have made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to a speedy trial because he did not know, "the exact nature of the crime he was charged with" when he executed the waiver. Id. at 70.